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ABSTRACT
While there is widespread agreement among economists and management scholars that knowledge
spillovers exist and have important economic consequences, researchers know substantially less
about the "micro mechanisms" of spillovers -- about the degree to which they are geographically
localized,  for  example,  or  about  the  degree  to  which  spillovers  from  public  institutions  are
qualitatively different from those from privately owned firms (Jaffe, 1986; Krugman, 1991; Jaffe et
al., 1993; Porter, 1990).  In this paper we make use of the geographic distribution of the research
activities of major global pharmaceutical firms to explore the extent to which knowledge spills over
from proximate private and public institutions.  Our data and empirical approach allow us to make
advances on two dimensions.  First, by focusing on spillovers in research productivity (as opposed
to manufacturing productivity), we build closely on the theoretical literature on spillovers that
suggests that knowledge externalities are likely to have the most immediate impact on the production
of ideas (Romer, 1986; Aghion & Howitt, 1997).  Second, our data allow us to distinguish spillovers
from public research from spillovers from private, or competitively funded research, and to more
deeply explore the role that institutions and geographic proximity play in driving knowledge
spillovers.
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rhenders@mit.eduI.  Introduction 
  Knowledge  spillovers  and  their  relation  to  the  economics  of  research  and 
development are central to much of the work of Zvi Griliches.  In a sequence of papers, most 
notably "Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to Productivity 
Growth"  (Griliches,  1979)  and  "The  Search  for  R&D  Spillovers”  (Griliches,  1992),  Zvi 
outlined both the importance of understanding the nature and magnitude of spillovers for 
economic growth, and the formidable problems that complicate empirical work in the area.  
The  importance  of  spillovers  is  well  established.    Their  existence  is  fundamental  to  the 
theory of endogenous growth (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1997).  Moreover, the 
assumption that publicly funded knowledge “spills over” from publicly funded institutions 
universities  and  laboratories  is  an  integral  part  of  the  economic  justification  for  their 
existence.  The measurement of spillovers, however, is a complex and difficult undertaking. 
  Zvi identified three critical problems associated with measuring spillovers.  The first 
is that of “distance.”  Zvi suggested that spillovers decline with the distance from the source 
to the potential recipient, and identified three sources of distance: market distance or relative 
position in the value chain; technological distance; and geographic distance.  The second 
problem Zvi noted is that of lag structure, since there is little reason to believe that the 
spillover  of  knowledge  is  either  instantaneous  or  uniform.    Finally,  the  existence  of 
spillovers affects the incentives of firms to do R&D.  While spillovers to a firm are likely to 
make  R&D  investments  more  productive,  and  thus  raise  the  incentives  to  invest  in  it, 
spillovers  from  the  from  the  firm  are  likely  to  benefit  competitors  and  thus  lower  the 
incentives to invest in research in the first place.  Thus, spillovers and R&D are endogenous 
variables, a problem that makes identification significantly more challenging.   4 
  A stream of scholarly work, much of it by Zvi’s students, collaborators and friends, 
built on this agenda to establish a consensus that, in Zvi’s words “spillovers exist and are 
significant.”  For example, using a novel measure of technological distance, Jaffe (1986, 
1989)  found  that  firm-level  R&D  productivity  was  positively  associated  with  the  R&D 
investment  of  “technological  neighbors”  and  that  local  (within  state)  university  research 
increased rates of corporate patenting.  Bernstein and Nadiri (1989) expanded on Jaffe’s 
results by incorporating a more elaborate model of investment behavior, while Ward and 
Dranove (1995) and Adams (1990) experimented with the use of very long lag structures.   
More  recent  work  has  attempted  to  expand  Zvi’s  research  agenda  along  two 
dimensions.  The first is through the explicit recognition that the effectiveness of spillovers 
may be mediated — both by the types of investment made by the recipient firm (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989) and by the nature of the contractual relationships between the source and 
the potential recipient of knowledge.  For example, Zucker, Darby and Armstrong (1998) 
argue that the positive correlation between the presence of “star scientists” in a location and 
the success of small biotechnology firms is driven not by simple geographic proximity, but 
rather  by  the  existence  of  contractual  relationships  (specifically  co-authoring)  between 
“stars” and particular firms.  Similarly, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) find that if firms 
believe  incoming  spillovers  are  probably  important,  they  are  more  likely  to  engage  in 
cooperative R&D agreements.  
The second line of work has attempted to link our understanding of spillovers to the 
geographic structure of multinational R&D.  Research in international business has long 
been concerned with the tradeoffs that multinational firms face between being “home based” 
or “distributed” (Frost, 2001).  In the context of the pharmaceutical industry, Chacar and   5 
Lieberman (2003) and Furman (2003) argue that this tradeoff is particularly salient -- global 
pharmaceutical firms can organize their research efforts in a single site in order to maximize 
the advantages of internal scope and scale, or they can decentralize their research efforts 
with the aim of accessing knowledge spillovers that are only available across the globe.   
In  this  paper,  we  explore  the  relationship  between  R&D  productivity  and  the 
potential  for  spillovers  provided  by  research  local  to  distributed  research  laboratories, 
drawing  on  a  sample  of  multinational  pharmaceutical  firms  in  the  1980s.    To  do  this 
empirically, we match more than 8 million records of worldwide publications by public and 
private institutions at the level of the therapeutic class (market level) and employ a firm-
therapeutic class-level panel database of drug discovery expenditures.  
Our work differs from existing studies in a number of important respects.  To our 
knowledge, with a single exception (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996), prior work in this area 
has analyzed spillovers at the level of the firm or of the laboratory, rather than at the level of 
the individual market, or product class.  We also test for the presence of spillovers across the 
world,  rather  than  in  a  single  region  such  as  the  US  or  Europe,  matching  worldwide 
productivity  to  both  locally  and  globally  derived  spillovers.    Finally,  we  explicitly 
distinguish between publicly and privately generated spillovers.  While several authors have 
explored the impact of privately generated knowledge on productivity (e.g., Jaffe, 1986; 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2003), with the important exception of Adams (2002), efforts to 
compare the relative effect of the two are scant. 
Consistent with expectations, we find that spillovers exist and are significant.  Patent 
output  at  the  therapeutic  class  level  is  positively  correlated  with  a  firm’s  “exposure”  to 
papers  related  to  that  therapeutic  class  authored  by  scientists  within  thirty-five  miles  of   6 
where the firm conducts research.  Distinguishing between privately and publicly authored 
papers yields a striking result: patent output is positively and significantly correlated with 
publicly authored work, but negatively and significantly correlated with private sector work.  
Our  results  hold  for  both  locally  and  globally  generated  work,  with  the  effects  being 
strongest for locally authored work but significant at both levels, and they are robust to 
alternative  econometric  specifications,  as  well  as  to  the  inclusion  of  controls  for  initial 
conditions in location and the geographic organization of the firm’s research effort. 
Our results suggest that, as many authors have suggested, public spillovers may play 
a major role in driving private sector productivity.  This finding builds on Branstetter’s 
(2003) evidence of significant spillovers from academic science to industrial patenting.  We 
also obtain a result not evident in prior empirical work:  private sector work may “crowd 
out” work by rivals or negatively affect their productivity, as some theories predict.  This 
may  be  either  because  competitive  success  discourages  rivalry,  or  because  competitive 
success may literally “fish out the pool,” making it harder and harder for rivals to discover 
new  therapeutic  entities  or  approaches.    Taken  together,  our  findings  suggest  that  the 
problem of the optimal location of research and development for a multinational company is 
a multidimensional problem of considerable complexity, and that the relationship between 
spillovers and economic growth may be more nuanced than is sometimes assumed.  We 
begin by briefly reviewing the relevant literature.  Section III summarizes our data and gives 
some descriptive statistics.  In Section IV, we outline our estimation approach and describe 
the results.  Section V concludes and offers suggestions for future research in this area. 
   7 
II.  Literature Review 
  Knowledge spillovers and Marshallian externalities of all kinds are fundamental to 
theories  in  economic  geography  and  to  theories  of  endogenous  growth.    Marshallian 
externalities reduce production costs.  They include the availability of specialized labor, the 
accumulation  of  human  capital,  the  availability  of  specialized  input  services  and  other 
specialized  infrastructure,  and  knowledge  spillovers  of  all  kinds,  including  face-to-face 
communication.    The  theoretical  literature  has  generally  not  differentiated  between  the 
effects  of  privately  and  publicly  generated  spillovers,  although  Jacobs  famously 
distinguished between localization effects flowing from the proximity of direct competitors 
and urbanization effects flowing from the volume of overall activity in the area (Jacobs 
1969, 1984). 
  Factor  mobility  therefore  plays  a  key  role  in  all  models  of  agglomeration 
externalities.  As a broad generalization of a large and complex literature, with high factor 
mobility and/or easily transported products, the theoretical models predict strong clustering 
as a results of small differences in initial conditions.  The endogenous growth models that 
incorporate  location  effects  (see,  for  example,  Aghion  and  Howitt,  1997  and  Fujita  and 
Thisse,  2003)  combine  core-periphery  models  of  industrial  location  with  Grossman-
Helpman-Romer endogenous growth models with horizontally differentiated products.  The 
R&D sector is modeled as using skilled labor to produce new varieties.  In these models, 
externalities tend to be mutually reinforcing: more agglomeration leads to more productive 
R&D, which leads to more varieties, which leads to more demand, more concentration, more 
externalities and so on.   8 
  Broadly  construed,  the  key  result  of  these  models  is  that  the  growth  rate  of  the 
economy is driven by the spatial distribution of the innovation sector.  With costless transfer 
of "patents" across regions, externalities and region-specific knowledge capital tend to pull 
all  R&D  labor  into  one  location.    Production  may  or  may  not  follow  depending  on 
transportation costs.  These theoretical models thus suggest that the existence and nature of 
spillovers have very significant implications for the nature of economic growth. 
  The  finding  that  the  spillover  of  knowledge  is  geographically  localized  is  well-
established (Autant-Bernard, 2003; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Feldman, 1994; Jaffe, 
1989; Jaffe et al, 1993; Evenson and Kislev, 1973), as is the finding that university research 
has a positive effect on the productivity of local firms (Jaffe, 1989;  Zucker and Darby, 
1997).  These results raise the question of the optimal location of large research efforts – 
since the choice to locate near a single cluster necessarily makes it more difficult to benefit 
from  the  research  conducted  at  another.    Large  firms  wishing  to  benefit  from  publicly 
funded research could respond by distributing their research efforts, but such a distribution 
is likely to be costly, since, as Chacar and Lieberman (2003) point out, a significant body of 
organizational theory predicts that there are very significant productivity benefits to the co-
location  of  research.    Allen  (1977),  for  example,  suggests  that  communication  between 
researchers  falls  with  the  square  of  the  distance  between  them,  and  although  modern 
communications have made the creation of “virtual” teams feasible, managing them still 
creates formidable problems (Cummings, 2003a, 2003b).
1   
                                                 
1   Note that another key choice variable for the firm is whether to do research internally (“make” or integrate 
the research function) or rely on licensing the research efforts of others (“buy” research).  However, all the 
firms we examine here performed a great deal of basic research internally, particularly during the time 
period we consider.  We therefore do not deal with this choice explicitly, and take it as given for our 
purposes.   9 
  Moreover,  work  in  industrial  organization,  particularly  in  the  “racing”  tradition, 
suggests that any single firm’s choice of research location will also be shaped in complex 
ways  by  its  rivals’  choices.    While  the  theoretical  work  in  economic  geography  and  in 
endogenous  growth  assumes  that  rivals  generate  positive  externalities,  industrial 
organization theory highlights the fact that increasing competition may trigger decreases in 
research investment or in competitive output (see Cockburn and Henderson, 1994, for a 
review of this complex and often contradictory literature and Aghion et al, 2003 for recent 
work exploring the relationship between market structure and investment in research).   
  The geographic organization of research in the global firm thus presents a unique 
setting in which to explore the consequences of geographically constrained spillovers for the 
organization of economic activity, and to explore the difference in roles (if any) between 
publicly  and  privately  funded  research  in  determining  research  productivity.    The 
pharmaceutical  industry  is  a  particularly  interesting  context  in  which  to  explore  this 
problem.  As a number of researchers have noted, the industry is critically dependent on the 
outcomes  of  successful  research  to  drive  firm  growth  and  profitability;  consequently,  it 
spends more on research, measured as a percentage of sales, than any other major industry 
(Gambardella, 1995).  In addition, publicly funded research plays a major role in driving 
industry investment and productivity (Ward and Dranove, 1995; Cockburn and Henderson, 
1998; Zucker and Darby, 1997).  As a result, the tradeoff between the desire to locate all 
research in a single location and the drive to disperse it across the world to take advantage of 
local spillovers is particularly acute for multinational pharmaceutical firms. 
  The implications of this tradeoff for the geographical boundaries of the firm are of 
particular  interest  for  emerging  research  on  the  strategic  management  of  multinational   10 
corporations.
2  Chacar and Lieberman explore this tradeoff using data aggregated to the firm 
level from 21 US based pharmaceutical companies.  They regress the number of NCEs (New 
Chemical Entities, a measure of research output) and patents against a number of measures 
of  geographic  structure,  including  whether  the  firm  operates  only  a  single  lab  and  the 
number of foreign labs operated by the firm, and find that firms with more foreign labs 
appear to be more productive than those with fewer.  They interpret this result as suggesting 
that locally  captured spillovers may  play an important role in driving firm productivity.  
Similarly, Penner-Hahn  and Shaver  (2005) find that Japanese pharmaceutical firms with 
international  R&D  facilities  produce  a  larger  number  of  patents  than  firms  with  purely 
domestic research facilities. 
We expand on these approaches in a number of ways.  We analyze the productivity 
of a firm’s research effort at the level of the therapeutic class, rather than looking at the total 
output  of  all  the  firm’s  research  efforts.    This  level  of  analysis  permits  more  precise 
comparisons  between  firms’  research  programs  as  well  as  within-firm  productivity 
differences across therapeutic areas that may be driven by local spillovers.  In addition, we 
test  for  the  importance  of  local  spillovers  by  constructing  local  measures  of  knowledge 
generation directly, rather than by inferring their impact from differences in the geographic 
construction of R&D.  Importantly, we explicitly distinguish between privately and publicly 
generated spillovers, allowing us to address industrial organization theories on competitive 
racing in R&D as well as the endogenous growth and economic geography literatures. 
                                                 
2   It is useful to note that additional work on geographic location in international business research examines 
qualitative issues associated with organizing and managing distributed firms (e.g., Ghoshal, 1993) location-
specific differences in the organizing strategy of R&D facilities (Furman, 2003), and the determinants of 
R&D directed FDI decisions (e.g., Chung and Alcacer, 2004); existing work does not, however, identify a 
link between distributed R&D location decisions and productivity.   11 
III.  Database Construction 
To accurately measure drug discovery productivity, we require measures of outputs 
and inputs at the level of the therapeutic class–year.  If it were possible to obtain ideal data, 
we  would  want  to  conduct  this  analysis  at  the  laboratory–therapeutic  class–year  level.  
Although  it  is  possible  to  attribute  outputs  to  individual  laboratories  and  to  measure 
knowledge-based inputs in the region local to specific laboratories, accurate measures of 
drug discovery expenditures are not available at the level of the individual facility.  As a 
consequence,  we  analyze  drug  discovery  productivity  at  the  firm-therapeutic  class-year 
level;  we  do,  however,  incorporate  facility-specific  data  on  knowledge  inputs  into  the 
production function we estimate. 
  We  measure  drug  discovery  output  with  PATENTS,  a  count  of  the  number  of 
“important patents” granted in each firm - therapeutic class - year.
3   Patents are considered 
important if they have been granted in any two of the three major markets in the world (the 
European Union, Japan, or the U.S.).   We assign patents to the year of application.   In 
focusing on patents-based measures of drug discovery output we build squarely on prior 
work in this area (Gambardella, 1995; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Penner-Hahn and 
Shaver, 2004).   We recognize that patents are one of many potential measures of outputs 
from the drug discovery process, including new chemical entities (NCEs), investigational 
new drug applications (INDs), and new products introduced and note that prior work has 
demonstrated a significant correlation between PATENTS and INDs and other measures of 
drug discovery output. 
                                                 
3   We rely on Derwent’s categorization of patents into therapeutic classes.  See Henderson and Cockburn 
(1996), p.57, for additional information on patent data from Derwent.   12 
  Part  of  the  novelty  of  our  paper  derives  from  the  level  of  detail  with which  we 
measure inputs into the drug discovery process.  Our methodology reflects both the extent of 
capital devoted to drug discovery research at the therapeutic class level as well as the extent 
of knowledge inputs external to the firm but present in the regions geographically proximate 
to  its  research  facility.    Our  measure  of  drug  discovery  research  spending,  DISC_IJ, 
represents millions of constant 1986 dollars of expenditure on drug discovery efforts in each 
firm - therapeutic class - year.  This variable is designed in order to measure the amount of 
expenditures  devoted  to  identifying  compounds  with  promising  medicinal  effects.    It 
excludes expenditures directed at development or other R&D activities.  The construction of 
DISC_IJ and its classification into therapeutic classes follows the descriptions of Henderson 
and Cockburn (1994 and 1996).  For each therapeutic class, we consider both a stock and a 
flow of DISC_IJ.  Stocks are computed based on the assumption that knowledge depreciates 
at an annual rate of 15% (Griliches, 1994).  We include the flow of expenditures to capture 
current differences in the research efforts of firms that are not picked up by differences in 
stocks.  For example, we might expect the research productivity of a firm that is beginning 
to ramp up a research program to be higher than that of a firm that is gradually ending a 
program 20 years old.   
To  capture  knowledge  inputs  into  the  drug  discovery  process  at  the  level  of  the 
therapeutic class, we develop novel and detailed bibliometric measures of the extent and 
distribution of publicly-available knowledge in the life sciences.  We draw on the National 
Library  of  Medicine’s  PUBMED  database  and  the  Institute  for  Scientific  Information’s 
Science  Citation  Index  (SCI)  to  construct  these  instruments.    The  National  Library  of 
Medicine’s PUBMED database includes bibliographic information from more than 4,600   13 
journals in fields of biomedicine and the life sciences.  The database covers journals from 
more than seventy countries.  It reports detailed information on each publication, including 
paper  titles,  author  names  and  affiliations  and  information  on  the  citations  made  and 
citations received.   
To classify publications by therapeutic class, we exploit another feature of the data 
from the PUBMED database.  This database classifies each publication using terms (similar 
to Journal of Economic Literature terms) that characterize the themes and content of each 
article.    These  descriptors,  called  Medical  Subject  Headings  (MeSH),  are  organized 
hierarchically  and  categorically,  and  each  paper  is  associated  with  multiple  MeSH 
categories.   For example, a paper that examines the effect of interfering with the renin 
angiotensin cascade in rats will be associated with MeSH headings for research on (a) rats, 
(b)  hyptertension,  and  (c)  the  renin  angiotensin  cascade,  as  well  as  a  number  of  other 
headings  that  characterize  other  elements  of  the  research  design  and  physiological  and 
anatomical systems being studied.   We focus on those MeSH headings that refer to the 
therapeutic classes of research addressed by particular papers.
4  Thus, using the PUBMED 
database allows us to create a useful indicator of the extent of research conducted in various 
therapeutic classes. 
The  PUBMED  data  do  not,  however,  provide  extensive  information  about  the 
location  in  which  the  research  is  done.    Until  recently,  PUBMED  has  only  listed  the 
affiliation and address for each paper’s first author.  In many cases, the leading researcher on 
life sciences papers is listed as the last author on the paper rather than the lead author.  As a 
result, we undertake a significant data effort to generate more complete information on the 
                                                 
4   These include branches “C” and “D” of the MeSH hierarchy; details can be found on the PUBMED website 
at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/meshhome.html.   14 
geographic  location  of  life  sciences  research.    In  particular,  we  draw  on  the  set  of 
publications  chronicled  by  the  Science  Citation  Index  (SCI).    The  SCI  catalogues 
publications  in  nearly  5,000  international  academic  and  industry  journals,  identifying, 
among other relevant characteristics, authors’ names, addresses, and institutional affiliations.  
Moreover, SCI data list each unique address and institutional affiliation associated with each 
paper.  Unfortunately, addresses are not matched to authors and each address appears only 
once per paper, even if more than one of the paper’s authors are associated with that address.  
In this paper, we consider each address as a separate observation.  Note that by using the 
address field in addition to the affiliation, we are able to match papers to the specific R&D 
laboratory within a firm, not merely to the firm’s headquarters. 
  In order to take advantage of the address affiliations (i.e., geographic information) in 
the SCI and the therapeutic class information available in PUBMED, we create a dataset that 
consists of the set of papers that appear in both sources.
5  Because the overlap between the 
sets of journals is not perfect, we lose a significant number of journals in the matching 
process.  However, we believe that a dataset that consists of only journals in both datasets 
has  conceptual  as  well  as  practical  advantages.    The  Science  Citation  Index  includes  a 
number of scientific journals outside the life sciences, while PUBMED contains a number of 
journals in the medical field that are not scientific.
6  The intersection of the two databases is, 
therefore, more precise in identifying journals whose articles may be considered as useful 
knowledge inputs into the drug discovery research process. 
We begin with the list of journals that appear in both the SCI and PUBMED datasets.  
Using this list, we identify 4.0 million papers in the SCI that could also appear in PUBMED 
                                                 
5   We merge these based on journal names and paper titles (where both are purged of all non-text characters). 
6   An example is a journal called Ontario Nurse, which is unlikely to publish cutting-edge research in biology.   15 
between 1981 and 1990.  Matching based on journal name, paper title, and authors’ names, 
we are able to identify 2.3 million papers that appear in both data sources.  We lose potential 
matches (a) because journals do not always appear in both data sources at the same time and 
(b) because, despite our best efforts, differences in spelling and word use persist across data 
sources.  For example, SCI and PUBMED differ on occasion in their use of British vs. 
American English, their use of text numerals vs. numbers, and their use of Greek and other 
foreign language characters. 
In order to classify articles by therapeutic class, we draw on the MeSH classification 
scheme maintained by the NLM.  Approximately 35 percent of all articles fall into MeSH 
headings that suggest relevance to a particular therapeutic class of drug discovery research.  
Articles that are not classified into therapeutic class include those written in for a more 
broad  or  basic  scientific  audience,  as  well  as  those  that  are  not  directly  related to  drug 
discovery research. 
Using the address information available from the SCI, we also classify each article-
address in our dataset geographically.  Article-addresses associated with firms in our dataset 
are assigned to the particular firm-laboratory from which they originated.  Thus, we know 
the geographic distribution of articles within each firm as well as across firms.  We treat 
each  address  as  a  “knowledge  observation”  and  are  able  to  identify  approximately  2.9 
million paper-addresses in our data.  In cases with a large number of co-authorships within 
the  same  organization  (or  address),  this  method  will  undercount  the  number  of  author-
publications because the SCI address field includes only ‘unique addresses,’ (i.e., it lists all 
of the unique address affiliations of the authors, but does not list the same address-affiliation 
multiple times if there are multiple authors from that address).  If the tendency to co-author   16 
with “insiders” differs substantially and systematically across regions, our measure could 
introduce a bias.  For example, our measure would assign more “knowledge observations” to 
a region with a total of 50 biologists split between two organizations than to another region 
with a total of 50 biologists all at the same institution.  However, we do not have prior 
information that suggests that such a bias is likely to affect our results in a serious way. 
The  SCI  address  information  enables  us  to  assign  each  article-address  to  a  “life 
sciences  region.”    Because  the  definitions  for  administrative  boundaries  (such  as  states, 
provinces, MSAs, or EU-NUTS regions) differ greatly across countries, we create regions 
whose  definitions  are  based  on  the  locations  that  generate  the  greatest  number  of  life 
sciences publications.  Specifically, each city that produces more than 5,000 life sciences 
articles  (equivalent  to  approximately  0.15%  of  the  world’s  total)  is  considered  to  be  a 
regional “centroid.”  For each region, we count the number of articles published by authors 
whose  affiliations  indicate  an  address  within  the  35-mile  radius  around  the  regional 
centroids.
7  (We accomplish this by using databases provided by the U.S. National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency that list latitudes and longitudes for world cities and towns.)  Where 
high publication cities are geographically proximate, we define the region based on the city 
with  the  larger  number  of  publications  –  e.g.,  Leverkusen  and  Cologne,  Germany  both 
produce more than 5,000 publications, but since Leverkusen produces more publications, it 
is considered as the center of its region with Cologne as one of its local cities.  
  To further categorize paper-addresses as either “public” or “private” science, we use 
the affiliation field.  All academic, government, and non-profit affiliations are considered 
“public” science.  These account for 90% of the total.  Of these, approximately two-third of 
                                                 
7   Increasing the radius to 50 and 100 miles had no major effect on the results we report here.   17 
public articles come from universities, while the remaining one-third come from medical 
schools and government sources.  We define “private” science as all other affiliations. 
 
IV.  Data Description 
  The  names,  definitions,  and  descriptive  statistics  for  our  key  variables  appear  in 
Table 1.  We draw these data for thirteen therapeutic classes from nine of the largest ethical 
pharmaceutical firms between 1981 and 1990.  As not every firm conducts research in all 
therapeutic classes in each year, we have an unbalanced panel totaling 704 observations.
8  
Our principal measure of drug discovery output is PATENTS.  On average, a firm is granted 
nearly  three  PATENTS  per  year  in  the  therapeutic  classes  in  which  it  is  active.    This 
measure is quite skewed, with many classes receiving zero patents in any one year.  Driving 
such patenting, the average firm expenditure per therapeutic class–year is $4.1 million (1986 
dollars).  (Note that this is significantly greater than the average level reported in Henderson 
and Cockburn (1996) because we define therapeutic class at a higher level of aggregation.)  
Depreciating  expenditures  and  patents  at  a  rate  of  15%  per  year,  the  average  stock  of 
PATENTS is 16.2 and the average stock of discovery expenditures (LAG DISC_IJ_S) is 
$11.7 million.  Across all therapeutic classes, the firms in our sample spent $47 million on 
discovery research annually and published 38.2 papers per therapeutic class per year.
9 
                                                 
8  As has been noted in prior work using these data, the research program – rather than the therapeutic class – 
is the ideal level at which to measure drug discovery productivity (Henderson and Cockburn (1996)).  While 
our data classification scheme is sufficiently sophisticated to classify publications data at the therapeutic 
class level, we cannot data at the level of the research program.  The therapeutic class codification scheme is 
sufficiently broad that each class may include multiple research programs that are not directly related to one 
another.   Combining research programs in this way adds noise to the measurement of inputs and outputs at 
the therapeutic class level; we do not believe, however, that it induces biased productivity estimates.   
9  Because data on publications are not available prior to the start of the sample period (in 1981), we compute 
stocks as they accumulate in the sample.  To correct for initial conditions in the local knowledge stock, we 
examine specifications that include a variable that reflects the initial count of public and private publications 
in each region.     18 
Our  sample  firms  differ  markedly  in  the  extent  to  which  they  invest  in  each 
particular therapeutic class, as well as in the number of publications and patents they receive 
(Table 2A).   While some firms maintain only one laboratory, many firms in the sample 
maintain  laboratories  in  multiple  regions  (and  countries).    For  these  firms,  there  are 
substantial  differences  across  laboratories  in  extent  to  which  they  perform  research  in 
various therapeutic classes (Table 2B). 
Likewise, there is considerable variation across countries and regions within country 
in the extent to which they publish life sciences research.  The majority of research emanates 
from North America, Western Europe, Japan, and Australia.   While this correlates with the 
extent  of  industrial  development,  it  is  striking  in  light  of  the  distribution  of  world 
population,  which  has  much  greater  concentration  in  South  America,  Africa,  India,  and 
Southeast Asia.  The distribution of research by therapeutic class varies across location.  For 
example, Cardiovascular research is concentrated in the United States and Western Europe, 
while  Parisitology  research  is  performed  in  a  wider  set  of  countries,  including  many  in 
tropical  areas.    (Figures  1  and  2  depict  the  world  distribution  of  Cardiovascular  and 
Parisitology research, respectively.) 
Geographic concentration in research is also evident within-country in our sample.  
For example, life sciences research in the United States is most extensive in California, 
Massachusetts, and in the area between Washington, DC and Baltimore.  It is also important 
to  note  that  the  the  geographic  distribution  of  PRIVATE  life  sciences  research  differs 
somewhat from that of PUBLIC research.   For example, relatively more PRIVATE research 
is performed in New Jersey and Washington during the sample period, while relatively more 
PUBLIC research takes place in Ohio, North Carolina, and Georgia.   19 
To evaluate the influence of external research on internal productivity, we compute 
EXPOSURE, which measures the number of publications within a 35-mile radius of each 
laboratory in which the firm conducts its research.  This variable is designed to capture the 
magnitude of potential spillovers from life scientists outside the focal firm in each period.  
Firms can increase their EXPOSURE to available research by locating in areas in which 
there are many other private or public institutions engaged in life sciences.  By measuring 
EXPOSURE  at  the  firm-therapeutic  class  level,  we  account  for  a  particular  location’s 
proximity to valuable science in one research area, but distant from science in other areas. 
On average, each therapeutic class is proximate to 33,000 papers authored by individuals 
affiliated  with  PUBLIC  institutions  (universities,  government  agencies,  or  other  not-for-
profit  entities)  and  fewer  than  1000  papers  authored  by  individuals  at  PRIVATE  sector 
firms.   
A second element of closeness to external knowledge is whether a firm’s geographic 
allocation of research in each therapeutic class matches the external geographic distribution 
of research in that class.  Developing measures that adequately  compare the geographic 
distribution  of  firm–therapeutic  class  research  with  the  geographic  distribution  of 
therapeutic class-level research outside the firm is extremely complex methodologically.  As 
a preliminary way of exploring this issue, we experimented with a straightforward measure 
of  the  match  between  the  firm  and  worldwide  distribution  of  class-specific  research, 
although we did not obtain conclusive results.
10 
                                                 
10 We experimented with the variable GINI, which we computed as the mean squared difference over locations 
between firm i' s share of its total activity in each location and the world share of activity in each location 
(Krugman, 1991; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996).  More formally, GINIijt = S(sijt-xjt)
2, where Xjt is the 1 x K 
vector of shares of each location k in the world total of activity in therapeutic class j and Sijt is the 1 x K 
vector of the share of each location k in firm i' s total activity in therapeutic class j (each in time t).  As 
smaller GINI values correspond to a closer match between the firm’s geographic allocation of science, we 
would expect a negative coefficient on GINI in the productivity regressions.   20 
V.  Empirical Results 
  We draw on the “production function” approach to the measurement of productivity, 
in which patents are generated as a function of the research investment of the firm and of its 
knowledge capital, in the manner of Griliches (1979, 1994, 1995).  We estimate a function 
of the form: 
  Log Yi,j,t = ￿(log Xi,j,t) + ￿(log Ki,j,t) + Ai,j,t (t)+ ui,j,t      (1) 
where Y is a measure of output at the firm (here, patents at the therapeutic class level), X is 
a  vector  of  inputs  (here,  current  research  spending),  and  K  is  a  measure  of  cumulated 
research effort and i, j, and t, index firm, therapeutic class, and year, respectively.  A(t) 
represents other factors which affect output and change systematically over time.  Included 
in this is, for example, exposure to local scientific and technical knowledge and measures of 
firm organization, such as the geographic dispersion of the firm.  Lastly, u reflects all other 
random unsystematic fluctuations in output.
11   
  This  is  a  reduced-form  specification,  and  thus  the  interpretation  of  parameter 
estimates is subject to many caveats.  For example, a firm’s patenting behavior may well be 
influenced by the R&D spending of its rivals.  Certainly, the selection of therapeutic classes 
in which a firm focuses research efforts is a source of endogeneity, and one we make no 
pretense of correcting for.  Here, we think the greater concern in the context of our research 
question is the endogeneity of location choice.  A firm’s choice of research location, and 
therefore exposure to local spillovers, could also be a function of its desire to avoid spilling 
over  to  competitors.    While  a  firm’s  research  in  a  locality  may  affect  the  efforts  of  its 
competitors in the same geographic area, we think it is reasonable to assume that public 
                                                 
11  The functional form of this equation should be interpreted as a first approximation to a much more complex 
relationship.  Most studies that use this technique explore the degree to which the results are sensitive to 
functional form.  They are usually not.   21 
research in a locality is exogenous. Most universities are older than the labs in our sample, 
and the location of government laboratories was also fixed during this period.  If a very 
productive firm began opening labs in additional locations (or assumed control of addition 
labs through a merger), then its exposure to local science would increase and we might 
erroneously attribute high productivity to spillovers from local science.  During our sample 
period, locations are largely fixed: firms did not open new labs or close existing labs.  Only 
one large merger occurred between firms in our sample, close to the end of the sample 
period, which we believe would have only a small effect. 
  Another potential problem we have in identifying spillovers is that both publications 
and patenting in a therapeutic class could be affected by exogenous shocks to technological 
opportunities for that class.  This affects our interpretation only if research in therapeutic 
classes is geographically concentrated, as our discussion above indicates.  To address this, 
we include therapeutic class fixed effects in one specification, which essentially control for 
the  initial  geographic  distribution  of  research  in  a  class.    The  coefficients  on  the  other 
parameters  of  interest  then  reflect  within-class  productivity  differences  across  locations, 
netting  out  any  technological  shock  to  the  class.    However,  this  does  not  control  for 
correlated  temporary  shocks,  which  may  still  be  of  concern  for  the  analysis  and 
interpretation of the results. 
  Tables  (3)  and  (4)  present  our  results.    Since  our  dependent  variable  is  often 
truncated at zero, in Table (3) we model equation (1) using a Poisson specification.  As this 
has the well-known problem that it imposes the condition that the mean of the distribution is 
equal  to  the  variance,  we  replicate  the  analyses  in  Table  (4)  using  Negative  Binomial 
regressions.  Our key results are robust to either specification.  We include year fixed effects   22 
in every specification to control for fluctuations in overall rates of patenting and for any 
general common trend in “propensity to patent” across the industry. 
  Model (1) presents the “base case,” including only our flow and stock measure of 
research (discovery) spending.  The coefficients are positive and highly significant, with 
magnitudes reassuring close to those that have been observed in prior work.  The differences 
in the magnitudes of the coefficients note that historical investments in research programs 
have continued effects on the productivity of current efforts. 
  Model (2) includes our measure of local spillovers, EXPOSURE_FLOW.  Recall 
that this variable is defined as the total number of papers (from both public and private 
institutions) published within a 35-mile radius of the firm’s research activity in a particular 
therapeutic area.  Consistent with prior research, this coefficient is positive and significant, 
suggesting  a  positive  association  between  the  extent  of  local  knowledge  and  research 
productivity.
12 
  Model  (3)  breaks  this  measure  of  local  spillovers  in  two,  as  a  function  of  the 
institutional  affiliation  of  the  author:  EXPOSURE_FLOW_PUB  and 
EXPOSURE_FLOW_PRIV.  EXPOSURE_FLOW_PUB retains its positive and significant 
coefficient, but EXPOSURE_FLOW_PRIV is negative and significant.  This is our core 
result, and holds across all models and both econometric specifications. 
  This is a striking result.  The positive impact of academic research on productivity is 
expected, and entirely (and reassuringly) consistent with prior research.  The negative effect 
                                                 
12 In additional, unreported models, we also experimented with including GINI, our measure of the degree to 
which the firm’s distribution of research activity in a particular class mirrors that of the general distribution, 
as  an  additional  indicator  of  a  firm’s  closeness  to  life  science  research.    GINI  was  not,  statistically 
significantly in any of these models.  This may suggest that matching the world wide research distribution is 
not correlated with research productivity; however, this result may also arise because this measure is not 
sufficient in capturing the phenomenon of interest.   23 
of privately generated knowledge on productivity is more surprising.  Adams (2002) found 
that  laboratory  productivity  was  correlated  with  both  publicly  and  privately  generated 
knowledge,  and  the  majority  of  the  theoretical  literature  assumes  that  spillovers  across 
private firms have positive effects.  However, our result is consistent with Jaffe (1986)’s 
analysis that controlled for technological but not for geographical distance, which found that 
private  sector  research  spending  was  positively  correlated  across  firms,  but  profits  were 
negatively correlated with rival’s R&D spending. 
  This is a reduced form result, so it probably summarizes a complex mix of factors.  It 
may be that extensive rival publication in a particular area reduces the opportunity for any 
single  firm  to  make  the  novel  discoveries  that  are  a  prerequisite  to  patent  generation.  
Alternatively,  extensive  rival  publication  may  signal  significant  future  competition  in  a 
particular market, thus reducing the attractiveness of effort in the area and the incentive to 
generate patents after research efforts have already been expended.  Indeed, there are likely 
numerous credible explanations for this finding and we believe that clarifying this result is a 
useful goal for future research. 
  Model (4) introduces N_CENTROIDS, or the number of centroids in which the firm 
(in this particular therapeutic class) has located research activity, another measure of the 
degree to which the firm is attempting to take advantage of research across the world.  It is 
significant  and  negative  in  the  Poisson  results,  although  insignificant  in  the  negative 
binomial specification.  (N_COUNTRIES, another measure of geographic dispersion with 
which  we  experimented,  is  also  negative  and  significant  in  both  specifications  when 
included in the model).  We interpret this result as consistent with the hypothesis that firms   24 
that are “stretched too thin” fail to take advantage of local economies of scope and suffer a 
reduction in productivity in consequence.   
  In model (5), GLOBAL_PUB_STOCK, the stock of globally generated academic 
papers is positive and significant in both specifications, while GLOBAL_PRIV_STOCK, 
the  stock  of  globally  generated  private  papers  is  negative  and  significant  in  both 
specifications.  This result is consistent with our local result, and suggests that firms benefit 
(or suffer) from global spillovers as well as from local.   The results from this model suggest 
that the marginal impact of an additional 1000 local publications is 0.19 PATENTS, while 
the addition of 1000 publications to the global stock of relevant science yields .11 additional 
PATENTS.  Thus, the implied elasticities associated with these measures are consistent with 
research in economic geography and endogenous growth that suggest that local knowledge 
is more likely to spill over than distant knowledge. 
  Model (6) introduces LOCAL_START_PUB and LOCAL_START_PRIV.  These 
controls attempt to address the endogeneity of research location by controlling for “initial 
conditions” in each location.  Their signs are consistent with our flow results, which are 
robust  to  their  inclusion.    It  is  important  to  note,  however,  that  the  inclusion  of  these 
variables  does  not  control  for  the  possibility  of  temporary  shocks  that  may  also  affect 
location decisions.  Model (7) presents the full model and model (8) introduces therapeutic 
class fixed effects.  Introducing therapeutic class fixed effects alters the interpretation, sign, 
and significance of the initial conditions variables, although it does not affect the paper’s 
core  results.    Models  without  therapeutic  class  fixed  effects  exploits  differences  across 
locations  in  public  science.    Much  of  those  differences  are  driven  by  specialization  in 
therapeutic areas.  Removing those differences in specialization by including therapeutic   25 
class  FEs  appears  to  leave  too  little  variation  over  time  or  across  locations  to  get  a 
statistically  significant  (or  economically  meaningful)  estimate,  except  in  the  case  of 
LOCAL_START_PUB  in  the  POISSON  model,  which  is  negative  and  statistically 
significant.  This unexpected finding may suggest that patenting productivity was highest in 
those therapeutic classes about which the least was known at the beginning of the period. 
In addition to the models presented here, we also experimented with a number of 
alternative specifications, including those that explored the effects of clustering errors by 
therapeutic class and by firm, and with random and firm fixed effects models.  While our 
results  are  robust  to  error  clustering  (the  standard  errors  increase,  but  most  coefficient 
remain significant at the 5% level), they are not robust to the use of random or firm fixed 
effects.    Given  the  very  limited  extent  to  which  the  geographic  distribution  of  research 
changes  within  the  firm  during  the  period  covered  by  our  study,  this  is  not,  perhaps,  a 
surprising result.  In this period, the geographic location of research is the firm fixed effect. 
 
VI.  Discussion 
  To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to explore the impact of locally generated 
spillovers across the entire world on the research productivity of the multinational firm, and 
among a small set of papers that distinguishes explicitly between the effects of publicly and 
privately  generated  knowledge.    We  find  that  locally  generated  knowledge  is  strongly 
correlated  with  research  productivity,  but  that  this  positive  correlation  is  driven 
overwhelmingly  by  the  impact  of  publicly  generated  knowledge.    Privately  generated 
knowledge appears to be negatively correlated with productivity, a result consistent both   26 
with a “crowding out” hypothesis and with the hypothesis that the anticipation of future 
rivalry reduces the incentive to patent in any given area. 
  Our  results  have  intriguing  implications  both  for  our  understanding  of  economic 
geography  and  for  our  understanding  of  the  global  organization  of  research  in  the 
multinational firm.  They suggest that there may be a complex tradeoff between the desire to 
locate close to sources of academic knowledge on the one hand and the desire to avoid 
competing too closely with rivals on the other and that it is possible that over dispersing 
research activities may have a negative effect on productivity.  They also imply that models 
that  fail  to  distinguish  between  the  nature  of  private  and  public  spillovers  may  be 
misspecified. 
  Further work in this area could move in a number of directions.  One is the attempt 
to model the endogeneity of research location more explicitly, perhaps through the use of 
suitable instruments and the more sophisticated structural modeling of investment choices.  
Such an effort will be a challenging undertaking, given the difficulty of finding appropriate 
instruments and the fragility and complexity of theoretical models of the problem.  The use 
of  data  from  more  recent  periods  that  feature  much  greater  variation  in  the  geographic 
location of research may help to address these issues.  It is also surprising that, if local 
spillovers from public science are so strong, pharmaceutical firms had chosen to locate in 
New Jersey, for example, to a greater extent than Massachusetts or the Washington, DC 
area.  However, changes since the end of our sample period in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
such as the growth of the biotech industry around Boston and the decision by Novartis to 
locate its research headquarters in Cambridge, suggest that firms may have, indeed, begun to 
respond to opportunity to appropriate local spillovers from public institutions.   27 
  Another  possibility  is  to  explore  whether  local  spillovers  are  mediated  in  their 
effects, as Zucker and Darby and their collaborators and Cassiman and Veugelers suggest.  
Public research in the medical sciences is very widely disseminated, and in some respects it 
is surprising to find that it has a strong local impact.  Is the positive effect of local research a 
function of institutional ties between firms and local institutions?  Using our data to identify 
co-authoring relationships between institutions may shed some light on this question, and 
add to the recent findings of Singh (2003) and Breschi and Lissoni (2003).  Similarly, the 
negative effect of competitive work, if it exists, should have global impact – why does the 
local effect appear to be so strong?  Additional work could explore the micro-mechanisms 
that lie behind this result, further illuminating our understanding of the dynamics of the 
geographic organization of research and the relationship between spillovers and economic 
growth. 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std.  
Dev. 
Min.  Max. 
Firm-Class-Year variables (representing data for firm i, in therapeutic class j, in time t) 
PATENTS  “Important” patents  2.96  4.56  0.00  34.00 
KPATS  Beginning of year stock of PATENTS*  16.22  18.66  0.00  127.21 
DISC_IJ  DISCOVERY FLOW 1986$M  4.14  5.66  0.00  48.67 
DISC_IJ_S  Beginning of year stock of DISC_IJ
*  11.70  15.56  0.00  105.51 
LOG DISC_IJ  Log of DISCOVERY FLOW 1986$M  0.56  1.78  -8.16  3.89 
LOG DISC_IJ_S  Log of Beginning of year stock of 
DISCOVERY
* 
1.15  2.48  -12.60  4.66 
KPUBS_OWN  Stock of own papers in class
*  38.24  53.41  0.00  373.59 
N_CENTROIDS  Number of centroids in which a firm laboratory 
doing research in t-class j is located  
1.90  1.28  0.00  8.00 
EXPOSURE_FLOW_PRIV  Flow of PRIVATE papers a firm is exposed to 
in the areas around its labs 
0.07  0.20  0.00  2.23 
EXPOSURE_FLOW_PUB  Flow of PUBLIC  papers a firm is exposed to 
in the areas around its labs 
3.16  3.26  0.00  18.67 
EXPOSURE_STOCK_PRIV  Stock of PRIVATE papers a firm is exposed to 
in the areas around its labs
* 
1.29  1.47  0.00  9.74 
EXPOSURE_STOCK_PUB  Stock of PUBLIC papers a firm is exposed to 
in the areas around its labs
* 
9.32  10.06  0.00  56.87 
LOCAL_START_PRIV  Stock of PRIVATE papers a firm is exposed to 
in the areas around its labs at start of period
* 
0.41  0.55  0.00  2.72 
LOCAL_START_PUB  Stock of PUBLIC papers a firm is exposed to 
in the areas around its labs at start of period
* 
2.86  3.50  0.00  16.62 
GLOBAL_PRIV_FLOW  Flow of PRIVATE papers in a therapeutic class  1.82  1.62  0.24  9.60 
GLOBAL_PRIV_STOCK  Stock of PRIVATE papers in a therapeutic 
class
* 
4.96  4.64  0.53  31.76 
GLOBAL_PUB_FLOW  Flow of PUBLIC papers in a therapeutic class  16.36  11.95  1.08  69.30 
GLOBAL_PUB_STOCK  Stock of PUBLIC papers in a therapeutic class
*  48.62  38.84  2.37  250.99 
 




















































Cardiovascular Anti-Infective Oncology Musculoskeletal Central Nervous System
Table 2A 
Distribution of PATENTS by selected Therapeutic Class and Selected Firms* 
 
*  Note that these firms are selected as illustrative of the pharmaceutical industry overall, and have not been chosen 





Distribution of PATENTS by Therapeutic Class & Location, 
Merck Laboratories 
 
Laboratory  Anti-psychotics  Antibiotics  Arrhythmia 
Rahway, NJ  14%  27%  22% 
West Point, PA  19%  4%  28% 
Harlow, UK  64%  0%  14% 
Dorval, CAN  14%  1%  48% 
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Table 3: Results from Poisson regressions, Y = PATENTS
^ 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
(StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr) 
Variable 








**  0.000 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.023) 










  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.022) 
  0.314  0.276  0.273  0.289  0.265  0.206  0.228  0.120 
EXPOSURE_FLOW    0.021
**             
    (0.003)             
    0.039             







      (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.017) 
      0.162  0.213  0.191  0.282  0.324  0.268 







      (0.209)  (0.204)  (0.216)  (0.201)  (0.196)  (0.199) 
      -1.879  -1.806  -1.315  -1.858  -1.770  -1.099 
N_CENTROIDS        -0.239
**      -0.259
**  -0.066 
        (0.044)      (0.045)  (0.047) 
        -0.438      -0.470  -0.105 
GLOBAL_PUB_STOCK          0.062
**       
          (0.004)       
          0.107       
GLOBAL_PRIV_STOCK          -0.597
**       
          (0.042)       
          -1.028       




            (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.051) 
            0.461  0.542  -0.212 
LOCAL_START_PRIV            -2.031
**  -2.277
**  0.355 
            (0.251)  (0.259)  (0.328) 










  (0.336)  (0.344)  (0.341)  (0.342)  (0.343)  (0.343)  (0.343)  (0.350) 
N  704  704  704  704  704  691  691  691 
Log L  -1895.7014 -1866.7618 -1850.7718 -1835.4602 -1734.7078 -1783.6405 -1766.6549  -1546.8752 
Pseudo R-sq  0.2248  0.2367  0.2432  0.2495  0.2907  0.2609  0.2679  0.359 
Year FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Therapeutic class FEs                 Yes
+ 
 
^ dY/dX is computed at the mean of the independent variables.  
*=significant at 5%, **= significant at 1%.  Dummy variables equal 
to 1 if LOGDISC_IJ and LOGDISC_IJ_S are undefined are also included in the regressions. 
+  Class fixed effects are jointly significant.  All but one are also individually significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 4: Results from Negative Binomial regressions, Y = PATENTS
^ 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
(StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr)  (StdErr) 
Variable 








**  0.002 
  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.037) 








**  0.032 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.032) 
  0.230  0.204  0.199  0.200  0.197  0.183  0.178  0.051 
EXPOSURE_FLOW    0.016
**             
    (0.006)             
    0.030             







      (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.030) 
      0.133  0.172  0.152  0.201  0.219  0.180 







      (0.363)  (0.363)  (0.361)  (0.353)  (0.353)  (0.332) 
      -1.864  -1.879  -1.587  -1.955  -1.869  -1.251 
N_CENTROIDS        -0.182      -0.187
*  -0.036 
        (0.094)      (0.095)  (0.089) 
        -0.340      -0.338  -0.057 
GLOBAL_PUB_STOCK          0.038
**       
          (0.008)       
          0.069       
GLOBAL_PRIV_STOCK          -0.356
**       
          (0.070)       
          -0.645       
LOCAL_START_PUB            0.156
*  0.178
*  -0.106 
            (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.085) 
            0.295  0.322  -0.166 
LOCAL_START_PRIV            -1.250
**  -1.338
**  0.369 
            (0.442)  (0.441)  (0.538) 










  (0.368)  (0.395)  (0.388)  (0.387)  (0.387)  (0.390)  (0.388)  (0.404) 
N  704  704  704  704  704  691  691  691 
Log L  -1413.44  -1409.28  -1405.02  -1403.17  -1391.93  -1383.95  -1382.05  -1315.63 
Pseudo R-sq  0.0877  0.0904  0.0931  0.0943  0.1016  0.0955  0.0967  0.1402 
Year FEs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Therapeutic class FEs                 Yes
+ 
 
^ dY/dX is computed at the mean of the independent variables.  
*=significant at 5%, **= significant at 1%.  Dummy variables 
equal to 1 if LOGDISC_IJ and LOGDISC_IJ_S are undefined are also included in the regressions. 
+  Class fixed effects are jointly significant.  All but one are also individually significant at the 5% level.   35 
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